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INTIFADA 3.0? CYBER COLONIALISM AND 
PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
By Helga Tawil-Souri and Miriyam Aouragh
Following in the footsteps of international organizations, including the 
United Nations, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 
and the International Telecommunications Union, on 2 May 2013, Google 
replaced the words “Palestinian Territories” with “Palestine” on all of its sites 
and products. Israeli deputy foreign minister Ze’ev Elkin immediately sent a 
letter to Google’s CEO urging him to reconsider the decision that “in essence 
recogniz[es] the existence of a Palestinian state.”1 It was not the first time 
that an Israeli official took issue with “Palestine” emerging as a recognized 
entity in the virtual world. In 1998, for example, Ariel Sharon, then foreign 
minister, personally lobbied the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) against its decision to award Palestinians an international telephone 
code. He claimed, in terms echoed fifteen years later in the Google com-
motion, that Palestine is “not a territorial or geopolitical entity,” and that 
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the “insistence upon the illegitimate use of the term ‘Palestine’ is liable to 
unfairly prejudice the outcome of . . . negotiations [at the time].”2
Palestine “exists” on Google and increasingly in various other “virtual” 
ways. But are “Palestine” on Google or the acquisition of the google.ps 
domain name in 2009 examples of political resistance on the internet? 
For Palestinian politicians, virtual presence has historical significance. 
Consider, for example, the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information 
Technology’s (MTIT) suggestion that “ICTs [information and communica-
tions technology] contribute directly to the national goal of establishing and 
building an independent state.”3 Within that context, Sabri Saydam, adviser 
to Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas and a former MTIT 
minister himself, posited Google’s 2013 move as “a step towards...libera-
tion.”4 For Israeli politicians, as quoted above, the emergence of (a virtual) 
“Palestine” poses ideological and practical dangers. Both camps ascribe 
power to the internet. Their only disagreement is over the ends to which 
the internet is a means: The internet is a threat to the existence of the state 
of Israel or a step toward a future state. At heart, however, both views are a 
form of technological determinism. They remove the internet from human, 
historical, and geopolitical contexts, and posit it as agent of political, social, 
or economic change. We contend that neither position is valid. 
Besides overlooking power relations and on-the-ground dynamics, 
a technological determinist view is inherently ahistorical. It neither con-
textualizes technological change itself nor the rhetoric around it. In the 
Palestinian case, the belief that new technologies hold within them positive 
liberatory powers is not new. In the early 1990s, for example, the internet 
hype came under the guise of connecting Palestinians, regardless of geo-
graphic location (in Israel, in the occupied territories, in refugee camps in 
Lebanon, and farther away in the diaspora), to each other and the world. 
And as the politicians’ statements evidence, the internet emerged for some 
as an instrument of economic development under the framework of state-
building within the occupied territories. At the end of the second intifada 
in the mid-2000s, scholars, politicians, and investors were still speaking of 
technology’s political promise, now under the framework of user-generated 
content (web 2.0).5 In tech jargon, web 1.0 indicates one-to-many consump-
tion, whereby most users simply download content. Web 2.0 connotes 
user-created websites, self-publishing platforms, and the many-to-many 
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interactions available through participatory and social networks. The 
enthusiasm for online activism raises questions about whether new forms 
of Palestinian political activism are possible thanks to the convergence of 
physical and virtual worlds, for example through participatory (blogs, wiki), 
social (Facebook), and geospatial (Foursquare) spaces. In other words, are 
Palestinians on the verge of an intifada 3.0? That it has taken more than 
twenty years to posit that internet activities are connected to the real world 
highlights the near-sightedness of technological determinism. 
In the last two decades, the internet has certainly helped Palestinians 
cope with their territorial fragmentation, facilitated the (re)unification of 
Palestinian voices, and helped strengthen pockets of collective identity.6 
These realities demonstrate that the internet is continuously “evolutionary” 
and that new processes do emerge. These realities, however, emerge from 
human decisions and practices, themselves based on historical conditions. 
In contrast to a technologically deterministic view, we contend that the 
relationship between technology and politics is nuanced and multivalent. 
From this perspective, we try to understand the potential of a putative 
“intifada 3.0” by unveiling the underlying contexts within which Palestinian 
(internet) resistance is taking place. Hence, we critically discuss what such 
resistance is attempting to negate and what structures serve to confine 
resistance online and offline. 
While we challenge the claim that Israel’s relationship to Palestinians 
is exceptional, the occupation, and political responses to it, must be situated 
within the structure of settler colonialism. As the French historian Maxime 
Rodinson argued, Palestine is not colonized in the “common sense” of the 
word.7 Palestine, as a nation in its abstract sense and as a territory more 
concretely, faces a form of colonial subjugation motivated by emptying 
the land of its inhabitants rather than “civilizing” the people.8 Building on 
this insight, we employ a political economy approach to technology and 
globalization and build on critical scholarship about our new networked 
age.9 Following in the tradition of scholars such as David Harvey and 
Dan Schiller, our political economic approach contextualizes the diffu-
sion of new technologies as part and parcel of the expansion of global 
capitalist market systems and hegemonic interests. We analyze issues of 
ownership, economic inequalities, capital flows, and their relationships 
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to geopolitical interests as means of highlighting the inequalities within 
the global capitalist structure.10 
It is of course imperative to understand the relationship of the internet 
and politics through on-the-ground practices. In this piece, we think 
through the relationship between politics and technology by addressing 
how Palestinian “internet spaces” are grounded in offline materialities. We 
analyze the structural constraints of internet activism by connecting the 
internet’s underlying neoliberal and colonial political economy and the 
“real” frustrations of Palestinian cyber-activists. We seek to bolster inter-
pretations of internet activism in the Palestinian (and larger Arab) context 
through considerations of the materiality of the internet and of resistance. 
In doing so, we mean to expose the economic and territorial structures 
that shape and seek to negate Palestinian resistance.11 In fact, the conflu-
ence of economic and political interests is clear in the Palestinian internet 
sector. The overlapping processes of Palestinian elites’ capital accumula-
tion, controls of Israeli occupation that deepen economic dependence, and 
(largely neoliberal) state-building efforts driven by foreign capital interests 
all structure this sector.  
This article aims to assess “internet resistance” in the Palestinian 
political landscape through a dialectical understanding of both settler colo-
nialism and what we term “cyber-colonialism.” Between 2002 and 2012, we 
studied policy reports and existing literature about resistance and technology. 
We also collectively interviewed political activists and computer program-
mers, observed political meetings and “street” demonstrations, witnessed 
the building of internet centers, spent time with youth at internet cafes, and 
analyzed countless blogs and Facebook pages. Specifically, our analysis of 
current political resistance builds on interviews with respondents between 
the ages of sixteen and forty from different political and geographic back-
grounds. Many of these informants are university-educated, with internet 
knowledge ranging from basic computer literacy to savvy programming skills. 
We also draw on political campaigns and tactics to understand how current 
manifestations of resistance shape political expression and organization, and 
vice versa. Interviews and observations with individuals under the umbrella 
of “internet development,” including corporate officials, civil servants, and 
political ministers, serve as the basis for our analysis. This article takes a 
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multilayered and historically rooted approach to understand Palestinian 
internet resistance and simultaneously “ground” the internet within local 
and territorial dynamics. The next section offers a brief contextualization 
of Palestinian activism itself. 
Palestinian Resistance
As widely documented in a corpus of literature, there exist several modalities 
of Palestinian resistance and an accumulation of political history stretching 
back over one hundred and fifty years.12 We posit “internet activism” as a 
continuation of Palestinian political practices against Zionism and the 
dispossession it has entailed since the 1880s. Contemporary Palestinian 
political activism began with opposition to heightened Jewish immigra-
tion in the late nineteenth century, and through the British Mandate, the 
height of which was manifested by the 1936–39 revolt. In the late 1960s 
armed guerrilla movements in Jordan and Lebanon (popularly known 
as the ayyam al-thawra) continued the struggle for Palestinian national 
liberation. The grassroots struggles of the first intifada and, to an extent, 
the second intifada offered examples of modes of resistance to colonial 
subjugation. Palestinians continue to face colonial oppression related to 
states, lands, and political rights. Consequently, Palestinian resistance 
remains (and must remain) a national liberation movement manifested in 
various forms of political practices. These forms include both violent and 
nonviolent means of influencing global opinion as well as civil disobedience. 
Despite the differences in tactics, however, there are challenges Palestinians 
continue to face: how to organize, how to mobilize, how to unify, and how 
to overcome occupation and colonialism.
This historical note shapes our understanding of Palestinian activism. 
Thus, we do not see internet resistance as a separate entity in opposition 
to other forms of resistance.13 We consider various and “opposing” forms 
of political activism possible on the internet as part of larger practices 
of resistance. These forms include Hamas-produced animated videos, 
cyber-hacks of official Israeli websites, and even the Facebook page of PA 
president Abbas that advocates a federational-state solution. In other words, 
Palestinian politics represents different strategies for liberation and does not 
synchronously move as a unified body subscribing to an official leadership. 
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Moreover, internet resistance is not the work of digitally connected youth 
suddenly emerging from cyberspace as agents of transformative change in 
the “real” world. As Karma Nabulsi argues, such a view of a “virtual” politics 
“reframes the issue of justice for Palestine in vacuous and unthreatening 
terms, casts the method by which change may occur into virtual space, 
and empties the Palestinian body politic of the thoughtfully articulated 
demands of its millions of citizens.”14
Contemporary Palestinian internet resistance occurs in and against a 
changing political and economic landscape. Structures of oppression have 
manifested in the “territorialization” of the PA since the early 1990s as well 
as the PA’s role in fragmenting Palestinian politics and its complicity with 
Israeli occupation. The internet sector highlights the problematic expansion 
of Palestinian elites’ capital accumulation. Together, the dynamics of PA 
oppression and Israeli occupation, illustrate the ways in which Palestine 
remains a “central quandary of superpower interests in the Middle East.”15 
The Infrastructure of the “Palestinian Internet”
The internet is not an ephemeral network disconnected from (Israeli and 
PA) oppression or territorial settler colonialism. The political economy of 
Palestinian internet reveals the PA’s complicity with Israeli occupation, 
Palestinian elites’ interests in capital accumulation, and the depths to 
which Israeli occupation territorially binds any Palestinian infrastructure. 
Alongside some of its “online” benefits, the internet reinforces a world of 
contact and influence between radically asymmetrical powers. We call this 
“cyber-colonialism.”
Internet use in the Palestinian territories grew exponentially in the 
early and mid-2000s. As one researcher observed in 2004, “ICT represents 
one of the very few hopeful developments in an otherwise hopeless situation 
. . . . ICT is deeply, and probably irreversibly, integrated into Palestinian life.” 
But he also warned that “like so much about Palestinian nation-building, 
the ICT experiment is driven by desperation.”16
Although necessity may have inspired internet adoption in the context 
of the territorial fragmentation of the early days of the second intifada, 
sources outside Palestine initially led the growth of ICT. Palestinians were 
first given permission to own and build their own infrastructures after 
108
the first round of the Oslo Accords in 1993. From that moment onwards, 
western diasporic Palestinians investing in the homeland and development 
agencies (Palestinian and foreign NGOs, the World Bank, USAID, among 
others) stressed the importance of ICT in the new world order.17 The growth 
of the internet (and the financial investment which made its expansion 
possible) echoed the language of “modernization” and “integration into 
the global economy.” The internet thus accommodated the interests of neo-
liberal actors and their tacit goal of engineering the Palestinian economy 
according to free-market values. The Palestinian Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation echoed the discourse common in many parts 
of the south that ICT is necessary because today’s world makes it so. The 
ministry stated: “A modern and competitive Palestinian economy must be 
information-based—or risk being neither modern nor competitive. . . . We 
Palestinians must be part of the global ‘new economy’ or we’re nowhere.”18 
This reality in Palestine coincided with a range of external factors such as 
the global growth of ICT and the changing structures of aid. 
The European Union continues to be the largest donor to the Palestinian 
Authority. ICT development has been under US tutelage, however. This 
influence includes the premier US government aid arm (US Agency for 
International Development), private hi-tech firms (namely Cisco, Microsoft, 
Intel, and Hewlett-Packard), and the heavy US presence in multinational 
aid agencies such as the World Bank. As has been documented over the 
past twenty years, the Oslo accords opened the gates for investors and aid. 
But Oslo funding structures also had to make “peace dividends” obvious in 
order to garner support from Palestinians for the unequal “peace process.” 
As a result, a “peace funding” matrix that pressed for high-visibility projects 
with shorter implementation time in order to demonstrate peace’s tan-
gible effects grew. The “peace” delineated in the Oslo accords and, equally 
important, in the 1994 Paris Economic Protocol (subsumed into Oslo 2 a 
year later), ignored issues of Palestinian economic, political, or territorial 
sovereignty.19 The economic protocols established a “customs union,” which 
preserved the lack of economic boundaries and uneven economic relations 
that already existed. Subsequent funding projects would thus never chal-
lenge the fundamental weakness of a Palestinian economy integrated into 
and dependent on the Israeli economy.
ICT also came with the added obfuscation of promises of job creation, 
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modernization, democratization, empowerment, and assurances about 
economic viability fostered by a technologically determinist perspective. 
US funders emphasized and preferred projects such as technology incuba-
tors to create and support ICT entrepreneurship, computer science depart-
ments and labs in universities, for-profit training programs such as Cisco 
and Microsoft Academies, and internet youth centers and refugee camp 
computer labs. Collectively, such programs help produce future economic 
partners and markets for US-based corporations, demonstrating the explic-
itly stated purposes of furthering US foreign policy interests in “expanding 
free markets.”20 As the Palestinian MTIT minister complained in 2005 in 
a personal interview about ICT projects: “I don’t like to work with USAID 
projects because I know it benefits them more than us. . . . But we must 
utilize whatever comes our way. . . . There is no other choice.”21
The confines of the United States’ “unshakable bond” with Israel also 
shape and limit US aid projects. Consequently, projects that the Israeli gov-
ernment deems unacceptable (for whatever reason) never materialize even if 
they might meet the objectives of “development.”22 Thus, most aid does not 
challenge but rather works to foster the economic and political status quo.23 
This problem is evident in the funding matrix after 2006, when the attempt 
to weaken, isolate, and “overthrow” Hamas came to govern the objectives 
and outcomes of assistance. Aid maintains, and further institutionalizes, 
the structural imbalances that characterize Israel’s relationship with and 
control over the territories. Aid structures do not challenge Israel on issues 
of territorial sovereignty, closures, borders, checkpoints, or settlements, for 
example, let alone on the structures of economic dependency. Instead of 
creating structural changes and links, aid projects work around those that 
have been imposed. Thus, development programs are not able to redress 
the damaging effects of Israeli policies. At most, the programs may try to 
mitigate these effects. Within this framework, then, internet projects make 
for a logical choice for US assistance. 
The growth of the internet also represents the strong link between US 
trade policies, US corporate domination of global information markets, and 
the needs of transnationalizing capital to invest in new spaces and create 
new markets. While the internet can offer spaces for political agency, its 
underlying economic limitations deepen two long-standing features of the 
global market system: inequality and domination. These two inhibiting 
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realities are already present in the territories due to Israeli settler colonialism. 
In 2003, under the tutelage of US and Palestinian NGOs, an internet 
center opened in a small rural town in the West Bank. Within months, it 
quickly ran up an insurmountable amount of debt. As part of its directive, 
the center was required to hire experts from the United States and purchase 
hardware only from Intel and Hewlett-Packard (HP), either directly or through 
their Israeli subsidiaries. One of the managers explained in early 2006: 
We could only buy computers from HP . . . and only from specific 
vendors. It didn’t matter that we could find much cheaper compo-
nents elsewhere, or imagine that we would want to buy some from a 
Palestinian company, no way. We had to follow [the project’s funders] 
orders. . . . This meant we paid hundreds of shekels more than we could 
have had we been allowed to buy on the open market.24 
Similarly, when technical problems arose, the center could not hire a 
local (who, ironically, had been trained at the center under the promise of 
job creation) to upgrade systems and fix hardware. As one team member 
described: 
They in the US [where the funding agency is located] said, “No, you 
can’t hire a local. We will send you someone.” So of course we have 
to wait for this guy to come here. . . . It takes him five months . . . and 
then, what, we paid him so much money that it was more than our 
whole budget for the whole fiscal year! And later, of course, he wasn’t 
here when things broke down again.25 
Such constraints were prevalent throughout the internet scene in 
Palestine. The project described above is not the only one that is dependent on 
foreign hi-tech firms to provide computers for youth centers and university 
students. For example, both Cisco and Microsoft Academies across the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip rely on foreign-trained experts to teach. Hi-tech 
incubators, such as the newly launched Business and Technology Incubator 
at Gaza’s Islamic University, are wholly dependent on foreign capital. Over 
time, some political campaigns began refusing donations because of their 
dependency “clauses.” As one interviewee told us, it would have been much 
better if Palestinians could work with open-source programs. Thus “internet 
development” limits the economic benefits for Palestinians. Palestinians 
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are not allowed to develop their own expertise to maintain their computer 
systems through open-source tools. Instead, they become “hostage” to 
monopolistic practices and dependent on foreign suppliers. 
Palestinian officials and elites championed the status quo in internet 
development projects. These elites embraced the assumption that growing 
an ICT industry could happen only through the liberalization of the sector 
and influx of foreign capital and expertise. For example the MTIT minister 
Mashhour Abudaka claimed in 2010 that:
the crux of the matter is that access to the internet is vital to many 
Palestinians who are imprisoned in their cities, towns, and villages. 
The internet serves as an important communication tool within the 
Palestinian communities and with the outside world. Palestinians 
need reliable, good-quality high-speed internet service at a competi-
tive price.26
Abudaka’s claim hints at an optimistic (uncritical) espousal of the 
internet’s possibilities and confirms the idea that “competition” and liberali-
zation are the only available economic models. In addition, and as Abudaka 
mentioned privately in a separate conversation, “If we have a successful ICT 
story, it will help convince the international community that we have good 
institutions and that we deserve independence.”27 Thus, a particular model 
of ICT is causally linked to the possibility of statehood, one that is “deserved” 
only when external forces say it is. Abudaka’s remark is a poignant reminder 
of Edward Said’s argument that “the rhetoric of ‘globalization’ amongst the 
Palestinian authority [serves] as an alternative to liberation.”28 Indeed, over 
the past decades both internet development and development at large have 
been wrapped in neoliberal structures that impede both the Palestinian 
economy as well as the possibilities of resisting an entrenched occupation 
and ongoing settler colonialism.29 The narration of the internet’s necessity as 
one way to redress Palestinian territorial fragmentation implicitly conveys 
an inability to challenge Israel’s territorial control.  
Territorial confinement also determines Palestinian use of the internet. 
After Israel abandoned the largely debilitated telecommunications infra-
structure existent in the territories in 1995, the PA handed it over to the 
private sector. It was at that point that the Palestinian telecommunications 
monopoly, Paltel, was born. As detailed in the Oslo accords, Israel would 
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control all allocation of frequencies and determine where Palestinians 
could build new infrastructure. Since part of the landline infrastructure 
already existed, its geographic condition would not fundamentally change. 
Most exchanges were located in Israeli cities. Thus, all international traffic, 
initially for landlines and later for cellular and internet lines, had to be 
routed through Israeli providers. Paltel and its subsidiaries would pay con-
nection and termination fees. Israel prohibited Paltel from having its own 
international gateway. In addition, Israel prevented Paltel from importing 
equipment, such as telephone exchanges and broadcasting towers, which 
would facilitate building a network connecting the Palestinian territories. 
As we know, Oslo fragmented the West Bank into three noncontiguous ter-
ritories. Area A, eighteen percent of the West Bank, was in theory under full 
PA civil and security control. Area B, twenty percent of the West Bank, was 
meant to be under Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli and Palestinian 
security control. Area C, sixty-two percent of the West Bank, was under 
full Israeli civil and security control. This territorial fragmentation also 
constricted telecommunications, as most infrastructure is usually permitted 
only within Area A; it is seldom permitted in Area B and never in Area C. 
In addition, Israel prohibited Palestinians from installing infrastructure in 
Israeli-defined buffer zones, and, after 2003, all along the security barrier/wall. 
Thus, Palestinian internet traffic relies on an infrastructure that is 
fragmented and dependent on Israeli networks. Hadara, Paltel’s internet 
service provider (ISP), became a monopoly in 2005. All Palestinian ISPs 
are essentially Hadara resellers. But Hadara itself cannot have an internet 
trunk switch that would circumvent Israel. Israeli authorities require Hadara 
to provide limited bandwidth for Palestinian internet use; internet surfing 
is invariably slower in the territories than in Israel. Israeli providers sell 
bandwidth to Hadara at substantially higher rates than to providers in 
Israel, making access more expensive for Palestinian users. Moreover, the 
Israeli government has enforced limitations on the kinds of ICT equipment 
permitted. The combination of higher costs, slower speeds, and limited 
technologies result in a constrained internet infrastructure. 
According to Khalil, an outspoken internet campaigner from Hebron 
living in Birzeit: “You can’t really change your subscription because all of 
[the ISPs] are the same and are therefore forced to provide the same quota. It 
is monopoly behavior; what Hadara wants gets applied by all companies.”30 
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Paltel (Hadara’s parent company) benefits from its monopoly status. Both 
internal and external interests push the sector to liberalize further and 
open itself to more competition. But without changing the underlying 
infrastructure under Israel’s control, the free-market promise remains the 
butt of sardonic jokes. In the meantime, Paltel’s response is that it:
has no choice except to abide by those official, judicial, regulatory, 
and legal orders on the basis of allegations related to competent 
jurisdictions among those official bodies and entities. Our role is to 
implement those orders and instructions and not to enter into such 
matters that the company cannot deal with or accept to be part of.31
This kind of behavior has inspired Palestinian discontent and resist-
ance. Some campaigns highlight the need for “internet resistance” to chal-
lenge the structure of “indigenous collaboration” that the internet sector 
so well exemplifies. 
Despite various limitations, telecommunications and ICT have expe-
rienced phenomenal growth. Paltel and the PA have profited handsomely. 
Paltel, whose largest investors already wielded substantial economic power, 
now boasts revenues that amount to more than ten percent of the total 
Palestinian gross domestic product. Its market capitalization represents 
more than half the value traded on the Palestinian Stock Exchange and it 
contributes about one-third of the PA’s tax income.32 Paltel is also one of 
Israel’s largest dependent clients. Thus, the PA and Paltel continue to func-
tion as the “subcontractors of occupation,” in the words of one interviewee.33 
The “Enough Walls” campaign challenged Hadara’s limited bandwidth [see 
Figure 1]. On the one hand, the campaign moves beyond the cyber-realm 
in contending with the offline and important material issues of bandwidth 
and ownership. On the other hand, such activism is misplaced in focusing 
on Hadara rather than the matrix of Israeli control that goes hand in hand 
with profit-seeking PA policies.34 Together Israeli and PA policies form the 
structures that confine Palestinian internet users.
Our next example addresses the tense relationship between online 
and offline practices in the context of Israeli territorial control. Palestinian 
Information Technology Association of Companies (PITA) is a nonprofit 
organization that aims to boost the ICT sector in the Palestinian territories. 
It is in the precarious position of bolstering Paltel as the largest ICT firm and 
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third largest employer after the government and NGOs. At the same time, 
PITA also supports the much smaller ICT firms that endorse the breakup of 
Paltel’s monopoly. One of PITA’s goals is to connect Palestinian ICT firms 
to markets in the Arab world by supporting local entrepreneurs’ participa-
tion in regional trade shows. “GITEX in Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi is 
huge,” explains the PITA chair about the largest regional ICT trade show. 
“But it’s difficult to obtain visas.... It’s difficult sometimes just [to] get out of 
Ramallah,” he admits.35 In response to this territorial and political reality, 
The Enough Walls campaign addressed the limited 
bandwidth available to Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. (Photo by author)
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PITA launched a Palestinian version of an ICT trade show, Expotech. More 
than ninety percent of the financial support for the trade show came from 
USAID, Cisco, and Jawwal (Paltel’s mobile telephone subsidiary). “Expotech 
is a big success and we hope we can make it more professional,” explained 
the chair in 2004, after the first fair took place. “Expotech is a response to 
these political limitations [of not obtaining visas and not being able to get 
out of Ramallah] and a way to assist local firms.”36 The most striking aspect 
of the November 2004 conference in Ramallah was that the attendees were 
all from within the confines of the city. Due to the Israel’s multilayered 
control, there were no Palestinians from Jerusalem, Hebron, Jenin, or Gaza, 
let alone anyone from Dubai or elsewhere. Here was an attempt to support 
a “virtual economy” coming up against very “real” territorial limitations. 
By 2008, Israel would further confine Expotech. Given that travel 
between Gaza and the West Bank had become impossible, Expotech began 
holding simultaneous conferences in both locations. While Expotech may 
indeed assist and support Palestinian companies and entrepreneurs [see 
Figure 2], it functions, like the rest of the ICT sector, within a limited frontier 
of territorial possibilities defined by Israeli settler colonialism. Despite these 
confines and the stricter constraints of moving around in the territories 
since the second intifada, the hegemonic appeal of a limitless and deter-
ritorialized internet has not diminished. As one entrepreneur who also 
holds the title of a “Google student ambassador” claims: “It doesn’t matter 
where you are and what you do, you can go anywhere on the internet—the 
opposite of what’s here in Palestine.” Another entrepreneur suggests, “I 
think the internet is very attractive to people in the West Bank because of 
the ability to export across the border. You can nurture a company only if 
it’s an internet company because all other sectors are blocked.”37 And yet 
that very same person is barred from traveling the eight kilometers between 
Ramallah and Jerusalem. Given this reality in which “Palestine” on the 
ground is fragmented and inaccessible, “Palestine” on Google as some sign 
of “resistance” is artifice.
In the Palestinian context, the political economy that underlies the 
emergence of the new networked age demonstrates how politics engenders 
technological infrastructure (and vice versa), and how the supposed expanded 
social and spatial boundaries of the internet are confined. The development 
of the internet in the occupied territories is a striking illustration of the 
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deepening economic power of a small business elite within the context of 
global capitalism. This is why we refer to the politics of the internet under 
Israeli colonialism as “cyber-colonialism.” 
Above and beyond these realities remain the lived experiences of 
continued Israeli settler colonialism. Novel contributions offered by digital 
technologies do not translate or map onto Palestine as easily. There is no 
exhilarating “scoop” because large-scale and extraordinary injustice has been 
a consistent factor in Palestine that scholars and activists have documented 
for decades. Israeli occupation is not an “exception,” nor is it a secret plot. It 
happens out in the open and becomes “normal.” The “normality” of occupation 
is why the Israeli soldier Eden Abergi was baffled by the negative response 
among Palestinians when she posted pictures on Facebook of herself in front 
of bound and blindfolded elderly Palestinian men. Abergi’s relaxed pose 
and confused reaction showcased the very normalcy of her acts.38 Moreover, 
that there was no global outrage demonstrates the normalization of violence 
against Palestinians made possible by the long history of the dehumaniza-
tion of Palestinians (as well as Arabs and Muslims, and the conflation of the 
three) in the international mainstream media.39
Collage of Expotech 2009. (Photos by author)
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Ongoing instances of heightened violence also influence Palestinian 
internet use in debilitating ways and demonstrate Israel’s “matrix” of domi-
nation.40 Consequently, the challenge of Palestinian activism is multifaceted: 
it entails maneuvering between online and offline organizing as well as 
attempting to circumvent crackdowns on those practices. At times such 
crackdowns are kinetic and overtly violent, such as when the Israeli army 
destroys hardware, bombs broadcasting stations, ransacks IT firms, and 
engages in other acts of “cybercide.”41 Other examples include the May 2012 
raid on the Stop the Wall offices, when computers, hard disks, and memory 
cards were stolen by the Israeli military.42 In December 2012, the Israeli army 
confiscated the computer of the prisoners’ and human rights NGO Addameer.43 
The sophistication of Israeli remote-control killings of Palestinian protesters 
is also a reminder of the contradictory consequence of internet technologies, 
though one falling outside the purview of our analysis here. 
Throughout the past twenty years the Israeli army has jammed and 
hacked telephone, internet, and broadcast signals. Occupation forces have 
destroyed infrastructure in far less violent moments. For instance, the Israeli 
army intentionally and repeatedly severs the only landline connection 
between southern and northern Gaza Strip, most recently in 2012. It also 
digs up fiber-optic cables in parts of the West Bank, uproots transmission 
towers, confiscates equipment, and holds up multimillion-dollar purchases 
while charging Palestinian firms “storage” fees. As Tawil-Souri argues, “The 
mechanisms of digital occupation are exercised through the disruption of 
everyday life, not simply during exceptional moments of violence.”44 Thus 
Palestinian internet resistance must challenge Israeli occupation, while being 
both dependent upon and constrained by it. 
Activists and everyday users alike recognize that the internet is con-
strained by Israeli military, economic, and “security” policies. For example, 
there is widespread awareness among Palestinians that their internet use is 
under surveillance. As one Paltel executive claimed: “How do we know that 
the equipment that comes from Israel is not tampered with?.... Maybe they 
make it weaker, maybe they put surveillance mechanisms in there.”45 One 
Palestinian had to retrieve her pictures and personal files from the Israeli 
police after the Israeli army raided her technician’s storefront. Israeli security 
forces have also used confiscated personal communications to blackmail 
others into collaboration. As one Palestinian woman concludes, she has 
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nightmares “of being imprisoned due to internet use…. How can one live, 
when everything is under control?”46 While cyber-activism may provide a 
certain amount of virtual mobility, it also puts activists back on the state’s 
radar.47 We asked Daoud, an activist at Stop the Wall, whether internet 
activism entails extra risk. He answered with a slight ambiguity: 
We don’t really worry about it for ourselves; we deal with the internet 
knowing that everything is being monitored already anyway. But for 
the foreigners we have some measures, such as not exposing their names 
online. But for the local community, can it be worse than having your 
activists arrested on a daily basis already?48
Respondents juggled the tactic of “going under the radar,” thus avoiding 
an online presence, and going on-line, regardless of risk. Activist use of the 
internet is a “negotiated” process. Activists promote or accept internet use 
in certain contexts and neglect or resist it in others. In Palestine, with its 
long history of resistance as risk-taking, this careful balancing act is part of 
a broader set of political ideas and practices.
Cyber-activists were profoundly aware of how these various materialities 
constrained their political activity. Dirar from Haifa but living in Nazareth 
explained: “For different realities and aims you need different tools and forms 
of internet usage.” He then demonstrated the acute dilemma Palestinian 
(cyber-)resistance faces:
I am against the idea of Facebook as a form of political struggle. We 
must consider our own tools, which are not restricted to commercial 
consumption or competition, but are about political action because it 
is not a matter of quantity but a matter of effectiveness. I believe in the 
saying that “the master’s tool will not bring down the master’s house.”49
Not all activists took such a hard stance, but all touched upon the 
flaws of a technologically determinist view, as well as the importance of 
understanding cyber-activism vis-à-vis realities on the ground. Twenty-eight 
year old activist Misbah, a refugee from Gaza living “illegally” in Birzeit, 
explained the essence of the flaws of internet freedom campaigns as follows: 
They present themselves as modern and via cultural artistic mes-
sages promoted in the media they send the message that “we can live 
together.” But it is not fair to represent Palestinians and Israelis as if 
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they are the same. They say they look for peace but I don’t believe that 
an Israeli living in my house and says “I’m with Palestinians” makes 
sense. The first thing he should do is to leave my house. Go out. And 
then talk with me about peace. It is really illogical that you talk about 
peace and yet you occupy my land.50
As Misbah points out, much of the rhetoric about internet activism fails 
to address the historical origins and the ongoing character of power relations 
in Palestine. Historicizing political events and technological innovations 
is crucial to a critical revaluation of internet activism. An understanding 
of the grounded opinions and experiences of Palestinian activists them-
selves, to which we turn next, is also crucial to any critical understanding 
of cyber-activism. 
The Contempt of Cyber-Resistance
The internet offers parallel spaces for collective community building. On a 
practical level, there have been many improvements for political mobiliza-
tion. A call for protest can now incorporate the latest facts and statistics, a 
well-designed logo, link to pictures on Flickr or videos on YouTube, and 
sometimes during the action itself, it can live-feed via Bambuser. Stop the 
Wall’s daily activism campaigns are often prepared in such an ad hoc way, 
sometimes in a matter of mere hours. These methods of political activism 
may sound like science fiction to the previous generation of Palestinian activ-
ists. Compared to the practical obstacles of organizing in the past, much has 
changed. Despite the multiple limitations discussed above, the internet has 
become part of the everyday tactics for many Palestinian political groups 
in unprecedented ways.
In the early 1990s, internet access was practically unheard of. It was in 
fact illegal until 1993, when the Oslo Accords permitted Palestinians to own 
and build their own telecommunications infrastructure for land, cellular, or 
internet uses. Despite the structural limitations described above, statistics 
have shown that for a long time and certainly until the Arab uprisings in 2011, 
Palestinian internet usage has been substantially higher than elsewhere in 
the Arab world. Reports show a systematic increase in household computer 
ownership from 26.4 percent in 2004 to 49.2 percent in 2009, and an increase 
in home internet access from 9.2 percent in 2004 to 28.5 percent in 2009 and 
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to 57.7 percent in 2012.51 Some have argued that Gaza has the largest number 
of Facebook users per capita in the world.52 Whether or not this statement is 
accurate, there is a correlation between political resistance, immobility, and 
internet growth. Regardless, increased access and use does not translate into 
cyber-resistance. In the analysis that follows we focus on how “offline” mate-
rial realities shape, influence, and constrain resistance, with close attention 
to the frustrations that emerge in the realm of cyber-activism.
As with all forms of activism, cyber-activists must negotiate multiple 
impediments. In the Palestinian case, impediments exist across a local and 
global spectrum, including internal PA oppression, political divisions, and 
concerns about the positioning of Palestine on a global (media) platform. 
Cyber-activists must equally contend with the complex landscape of Israeli 
occupation, territorial fragmentation, and Zionist narratives. These challenges 
are processes that shape and are shaped by online and offline grassroots politics. 
Repression of activists deemed oppositional by the PA has been a 
reality since the founding days of Yasser Arafat’s presidency in 1993. PA 
forces under President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas officials in Gaza have 
harshly repressed activists, curbing what they deem subversive online poli-
tics, cracking down on expressions of opposition to Israeli occupation and 
blog posts as benign as those mocking the president.53 Activists witnessed a 
disturbing increase of internal oppression as manifested in the crackdown 
upon protests against the Israeli military attacks on Gaza in December 2008. 
Interviewees described the PA as practicing “indigenous collaboration” and 
being a “subcontractor of occupation,” and contextualized the US-guided 
security apparatus as the process of “Daytonization,” in reference to Lt. Gen. 
Keith Dayton of the US Army, who served as the security coordinator for 
Israel and the PA between 2005 and 2010. Since the mid-2000s, moreover, 
activists have faced greater internal fragmentation. In fact, the Hamas-
Fatah divide has had an extraordinarily demoralizing effect. These realities 
further fragmented the Palestinian body politic as it pursued different forms 
of resistance. Meanwhile, political rallies, face-to-face meetings, a free 
press, and other platforms for open communication were impossible due to 
Hamas-Fatah infighting, curfews, closures, military incursions, or exile. On 
a larger scale, the reality of political constraints on the ground meant that 
many Palestinians, including political parties, underground militants, and 
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stateless refugees, were forced to organize outside the confines of “official” 
politics, and online.
The birth of the second intifada in September 2000 demonstrated a 
media transformation and an increase of publicly mediated protest that has 
deeply influenced Palestinian activism. Online media, and in particular 
citizen journalism during the second intifada, offered the world the ability to 
“see” what was happening inside Palestine. Indeed, global public opinion is 
another realm with which cyber-activism contends. But in the ten years that 
have passed since the first experiences with these forms of internet activism 
targeted at the outside world, most Palestinian activists we interviewed learned 
that a negative politics of representation was due to weak Palestinian efforts. 
Many internet/citizen journalism efforts confirmed that the problem lies more 
with biases inside editorial boards and the economic interests of particular 
Western governments. During discussions, cyber-activists often brought up 
the astonishing new media material produced by activist groups in Palestine 
documenting Israeli army and settler violence, especially Active Stills and 
Shooting Back, but disagreed over whether the images of everyday violence 
tempered soldiers’ actions or led to any international reprimands.54 While 
debates about the extent and impact of such examples continue, activists 
agreed that new media in and of itself will never be able to shake the shackles 
of Israeli occupation off Palestine. In the words of Mahir in Ramallah: 
We can post YouTube clips of soldiers’ mistreatment [of Palestinians]. 
Maybe some of the B’tselem videos [from Shooting Back] make a 
small dent, maybe Burnat’s film [Five Broken Cameras] rallies a few 
foreigners to the Palestinian cause. But these don’t stop the ongoing 
violence of occupation!55 
Many shared Mahir’s frustration. Recognition has only hardened new 
activists and made them more pragmatic about the virtues of the internet. In 
the dominant media landscape, not everyone agrees that the media should be 
a target of political campaigns. For example, one activist objected to the focus 
on media activism. “This public opinion is not a ‘friend’s’ opinion; I don’t 
understand internet campaigns focusing on convincing the ‘international 
world.’ Isn’t that basically one that has to be resisted rather than desperately 
recruited?” explained Walid.56 Walid also touched on the geopolitical selec-
tivity surrounding receptions of popular uprisings. Technological novelty 
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was the main point in the celebrated reactions to the YouTube videos during 
the Iranian protests in 2009 or the framing of Facebook as a revolutionary 
turning point in Egypt in 2011. But if the medium was the main message, 
then efforts such as those undertaken by Active Stills and Shooting Back 
would have ended Israeli military and settler aggression. 
On a regional level, the Arab uprisings have also had an impact on local 
revolutionary forces. Certain activists, inspired by their Egyptian, Tunisian, 
and Bahraini counterparts, have echoed the call for revolutionary change in 
the streets of Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem, and Gaza. New grassroots initiatives 
like the March 15 coalition or the Palestinian Youth Movement, led mostly 
by youth and in the context of the Arab uprisings, are a direct result of this 
inspiration [see Figures 3 and 4]. The March 15 campaign attracted attention 
in the media and inspired initiatives such as the Third Intifada Facebook 
group. After Zionist mobilization gathered enough signatories that deemed 
the page inappropriate, Facebook closed it. But numerous mirror groups 
quickly appeared to protest this silencing campaign. Their main demand 
was an end of the Hamas-Fatah split and a reorganization of the Palestinian 
political movements to face a common enemy. 
The May 15 protests, revolving around the Nakba Day commemora-
tions, were even more intense and transnationally organized [see Figure 
4]. Thousands marched toward the northern borders shared with Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Syria. Others marched toward checkpoints in the occupied ter-
ritories, and still others marched toward Gaza from Egypt.57
The March 15 Coalition (also 
known as the Palestinian Youth 
Movement) was considered a 
call to action in response to the 
Arab uprisings. (Screenshot 
courtesy of activists)
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Third Intifada Facebook group, an offshoot of the March 15 mobilizations, generated 
thousands of followers. (Screenshot from May 2013, courtesy of activists)
Palestine Loves Israel is an Israeli-led public diplomacy campaign aiming to 
collect “likes.” (Screenshot from May 2013, courtesy of https://www.
facebook.com/pages/Palestine-Loves-Israel/209640082469004)
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The Arab uprisings have also discouraged sections of the Palestinian 
grassroots movement, as many felt “trapped” in a deadlock about regional 
alliances with authoritarian regimes. By 2012, many of the activists inter-
viewed in 2009–10 had dissolved their coalitions due to disputes about the 
legitimacy of the Syrian uprising. This political divergence spilled over into 
shouting matches and fistfights at the World Social Forum (WSF) in 2013 
in Tunisia, the first WSF held in the Arab world since the Arab uprisings. 
Palestinian delegates found themselves wedged between rival groups, each 
trying to elevate its standing with claims of support for the Palestinian 
cause.58 Many of these contestations take place online between competing 
Facebook groups and YouTube posts, demonstrating that cyberspace is as 
much a unifying and fragmenting force for Palestinian activists as is the 
“real” world. Thus, regardless of technological developments, Palestinian 
resistance remains lodged in grounded realities and regional power rela-
tions. This interdependent relation has become more tenuous as the upris-
ings moved into a counterrevolutionary dynamic in Syria and tensions in 
Egypt mounted in the wake of the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral victory 
and subsequent overthrow by military coup.
One can hardly think of the politics of Palestine without locating it 
in broader geographic terms. The realities of those in exile highlight this 
expansive geography. Our next example demonstrates the internet’s use 
as an enabling tool for those “outside” to reconnect. It is another instance 
that problematizes the connection between the virtual and the territorial. 
For example, Palestine Remembered is a website that primarily focuses on 
Palestine pre-1948 and especially the many “lost” or “erased” villages and 
cities [see Figure 6]. The website provides historical accounts that include 
everything from details on land loss, personal biographies, old photographs, 
and videos of oral histories. The site does not simply provide a space for 
creating maps of the past and the present. Videos, testimonies, statistics, 
responses by users, and pictures of historical events or current-day “lost” 
villages attempt to “re-create” and “preserve” Palestine in the cyber-realm. 
Such sites are spaces of memorializations that emphasize Palestinians’ 
historical claims. They are certainly forms of what Rochelle Davis names 
“geographic nostalgia.”59 Yet the very act of mapping the past produces an 
authority to know and to imprint presence on these lost and interrupted 
lands and histories in the present and the future.
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With respect to cyber-activism, “Palestine” is more than a contested 
territory; it has also become a virtual space through which people can reter-
ritorialize themselves onto the lost (historical, physical, distant) spaces of 
Palestine. These sites challenge hegemonic Israeli/Zionist versions of nar-
ratives about the land, the people, and the conflict. Palestine Remembered 
provides Palestinians with the space to visualize and virtually recreate the 
entirety of Palestine and negotiate its historical erasure. These practices are 
salient examples of how the internet “opens” Palestine to its diaspora, to 
those in exile, to those from the past, and to those not “there.” To enable an 
approximation of “Palestine” is to engage in social media in a collective space.
Malcolm Gladwell described online activism as a weak tie, as opposed 
to high-risk activism that relies on strong ties.60 Despite the unneces-
sary dichotomy between weak-strong or online-offline politics that have 
hampered the debates about internet activism, it is undeniably the latter 
dynamic that concerns one’s comrades, future, and tangible everyday reality 
in the Palestinian context. Engaging social media can be “empowering” in 
some cases, but online social networks offer activists less political agency 
Users preserve their memories and presence on an erased Palestinian village. 
(Screenshot from 2005, courtesy of palestineremembered.com)
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as corporate algorithms and Facebook monopolism increasingly filter 
and define the digital world. Open-source or noncommercial alternatives 
remain largely marginalized in the commercial landscape. The sense of 
impact based on a selective community (that mirrors one’s own) blurs the 
boundaries between reality and fantasy, creating unrepresentative bubbles. 
As Pariser argues, political involvement on Facebook creates a form of 
engagement that is essentially apolitical because one is debating, sharing, 
and inviting those already on the same side of the equation.61 For Walid 
from Jerusalem this engagement “creates a kind of self-rejoicing,” and for 
Ahmad from Ramallah “sometimes it’s more about our self-esteem.”62 When 
pushed on why he was skeptical about online activism, Ahmad said that it 
was just “online masturbation” that had become the goal rather than a tool 
for organizing.63 Palestinian activists have criticized this trend before, but 
they also relate this dynamic to the absence of offline space or freedom for 
political practice. As Walid warned, “When we only use these methods we 
divert our attention. Instead of fighting we are forwarding emails.”64 The 
subtext of these rough labels is a tendency to indulge in time-consuming 
interaction rather than partake in physical action.
How online campaigns involve those not online is also a crucial chal-
lenge, but even those already on Facebook are not guaranteed to participate 
on equal terms. Faysal, from a village near Ramallah points out: 
Revolutions come from poverty, hunger, oppression, and so on. There 
was a demonstration in Ramallah for Gaza on New Year’s Eve [2009] 
mainly organized on Facebook. Some people came straight from 
parties via these Facebook invitations. Some of them were drunk. It 
was actually painful to see: where is the anger, the tears, where is the 
real thing? They behaved as if it’s a social gathering. It has become like, 
“I’m angry, I’ll make a Facebook cause, then I’ll be relieved.”65 
During the war on Gaza in 2008–9, many Facebook groups appeared 
with names such as Free Palestine and Electronic Republic of Palestine, as 
well as additional applications such as the Free Palestine Twibbon, a digital 
ribbon one can attach to a profile picture. But this growth is also what led ‘Ala’, 
active in the Palestinian prisoners campaign, to take issue with the campaigns:
The potentials of Web 2.0 are great but it also fragments. Look at how 
many Facebook groups there are now, set up for the same causes. 
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Hundreds! How are you going to organize properly if it is so frag-
mented? It creates a false sense of mass mobility and they are largely 
made by the same people.66 
Dirar took a similar stance, but also described online protests as 
social activities:
For me Facebook is like a big space where everyone can shout and 
scream with permission and then go back to reality. In essence, there is 
nothing serious about it. Being on Facebook is a private not a political 
matter. It’s consumption. I never treat it seriously. It is like demonstra-
tions nowadays. I don’t think demonstrations are tools of resistance 
as they were before, but I do go and I like it. Like Facebook, I consider 
it mainly a social means with a space to spread your political ideas.67
A large majority of the interviewees cautioned that online experiences 
with activism and resistance do not automatically transform into offline 
experiences. 
The skepticism we heard among many Palestinian activists also stems 
from the way corporate social media as a whole treats anything Palestinian, 
as the lack of outrage over the Abergi Facebook photographs mentioned above 
demonstrate. There has been a love/hate relationship between Palestinians 
and Facebook from the very start. Many Facebook users protested online 
when Facebook linked “fans” of Palestine to pages about Israel, changed 
the location or address of Palestinians’ profiles to Israeli cities, and banned 
pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist groups.
Many interviewees recognized a correlation between the strength of 
grassroots activism offline and what they considered significant activism on 
or via the internet. For instance, the aforementioned March 15 and Third 
Intifada campaigns were new modes of political organizing by a younger 
generation creatively merging a strong offline strategy with an online pres-
ence. This is testimony of a new style of transnationally mediated activism 
having already incorporated social media as part of everyday life. But it is 
mainly and perceptibly the offline determination and demonstration that 
has rendered the online dissemination and mediation so significant. The 
offline political space is where activists mostly learn these practical and 
moral political lessons. The offline political space is also where activists 
128
recognize their activism must take place. Maria, responsible for maintaining 
the website and online networks of one of the most active grassroots cam-
paigns in Palestine, Stop the Wall, admitted:
To be honest, it will not affect the wall directly, except that it clearly 
expresses our message to the international community. The internet 
is the international tool for mobilization and for raising awareness, 
so of course you cannot ignore it. But the internet itself is nothing 
without the activism on the ground.68 
Intifada 3.0?
The contentious debates over “Palestine” on Google speak to the 
changing nature of physical and virtual spaces in the age of globalization 
and the digitization of the conflict. The internet is not a marginal space in 
the field of cultural production and the politics of resistance. Taken together 
with other practices, internet practices widen the space for subversive 
maneuvering. internet resistance allows Palestinians to voice their claims, 
to perpetuate their history, to mobilize, and to help construct or reconnect 
Palestinian narratives. “Palestine” is also a virtual space through which 
individuals imagine, maintain, and negotiate a nation and a state. While 
the internet affords empowering spaces and can be significant for grassroots 
activism, the disempowering materiality of technology shapes that very 
activism. As such, there are extremely important caveats that have been 
the central focus of the discussions above. 
First, the political demands underlying much of Palestinian internet 
activism are not new, but shaped by a dynamic history. The implications 
of internet activism should be considered in relation to the offline world. 
As we have shown above, Palestinian activists must tactically avoid their 
digital occupation. They can use social media to mobilize and inform, but 
these practices expose them to surveillance and possible arrest. They can 
launch Facebook fan-based pages, but must abide by the corporations’ rules. 
Facebook posts can receive thousands of “likes,” but posts and likes are 
often unaccompanied by on-the-ground activity. Those in the diaspora can 
post on sites such as Palestine Remembered and help keep the memory of 
“Palestine” alive, but it does not help them return to their villages or rebuild 
what has been destroyed. 
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Second, although often playing an important role for international 
mobilization by Palestinian groups, the internet is seldom used as the primary 
tool in mobilization and campaign strategies targeting internal Palestinian 
politics. This is not simply because Palestinians experience occupation every 
day or because other mediums continue to be as important. It is because 
the power structures that exist in the “tangible” realm do not disappear 
in the “virtual” realm. The PA’s and Hamas’s crackdown on internet use 
mentioned above is a political reality. In the meantime, Israeli firms and 
Palestinian elites continue to profit from and exploit Palestinians, even in 
the virtual realm.
Finally, as we have evidenced, the internet faces territorial limitations, 
which are compounded by military measures and illegal competition by 
Israeli providers. Israeli official policy limits what equipment can be installed 
and defines how and where installation can take place. The Israeli military 
confiscates equipment and forbids its import (or delays approval of equipment 
requests), and occasionally destroys machinery and infrastructure during 
military operations. These practical consequences are not divorced from 
capitalist dogma but strongly shaped by it. Above and beyond that, while 
the Palestinian economy as a whole is pushed to liberalize, Israeli control, 
PA and Palestinian capital accumulation, and the hegemonic appeal of 
neoliberal policies remain unchallenged. Through the internet, new forms 
of colonialism are extended.
In summary, Palestinian internet resistance not only has to battle 
oppression at the hands of PA and Hamas, overcome that Fatah-Hamas 
division, and confront Israeli settler colonialism. It must also contend with 
cyber-colonialism, whose roots are deeply embedded in local and interna-
tional interests. Any consideration of a “new politics” has to consider both 
the superstructure and its base—and the constant interaction in between. 
Contemporary political formations and identities must consider the content, 
audience, and flows on the internet, as well as the infrastructures, decisions, 
and controls that allow, constrain, and forbid these flows to occur. An inti-
fada 3.0 will have to challenge both Israeli settler colonialism and the more 
seemingly “immaterial” cyber-colonialism. Only then can an intifada 3.0 
serve as the model of a new paradigm of resistance in our hyper-capitalist 
global yet disparate and asymmetrical new network age.
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JERUSALEM’'S SEPARATION WALL AND GLOBAL 
MESSAGE BOARD: 
GRAFFITI, MURALS, AND THE ART OF SUMUD
By Craig Larkin
All this graffiti that you see on the wall, even when it’s not political, 
is not an act of adjustment. It’s an act of resistance! 
  Shopkeeper from East Jerusalem, 9 February 2011
 
Israel’s “security fence” (geder ha-hafrada) or Palestine’s “apartheid wall” 
(jidar al-faşl al-‘unşuri)1 currently covers 708 kilometers, annexes 9.4 percent 
of The West Bank, integrates eighty Israeli settlements, and separates about 
fifty-five thousand Palestinian Jerusalemites from their kin in The West Bank. 
The barrier’s construction continues to provoke a wide range of resistance 
discourses, international protests, and solidarity campaigns.2 A plethora of 
scholarship and media coverage has sought to challenge the wall’s legality,3 
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